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Nuclear Power Wastes: Tomorrow's Problem Faces
Us Today
J. Philip Bromberg*
INTRODUCTION

The expansion of our nuclear capacity is the most controversial
of the manifold issues presently associated with the production of
energy. This controversy centers about two separate but related
aspects of nuclear energy production. The first is associated with the
safety of the reactors themselves. The second, which will be addressed in this article, concerns itself with the ultimate safe disposal
of the high level radioactive wastes generated as a byproduct of
these reactor operations.' The expected quantity of high level waste
is immense,' and the safe disposal of these wastes poses a technological and societal problem of the highest magnitude. Spent fuel elements must be reprocessed, and it is precisely at this juncture where
the forces of sociology, psychology, law, politics, economics, and
technology meet in a head-on collision. It is clear that unless the
problems associated with the storage can be satisfactorily resolved,
the pace of construction of nuclear generating facilities cannot proceed at a rate commensurate with needs as perceived in many quarters of the government charged with planning and effectuating an
overall energy supply program for the nation. The importance of
nuclear waste disposal and the need to consider this disposal in the
planning of new facilities is just now beginning to attract judicial
attention. In a recent decision' the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia remanded the licensing of the Vermont
* The author received a B.S. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology; an M.S. from
California Institute of Technology; a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago; and a J.D. from
Duquesne University School of Law. He is currently an attorney and consultant in environmental and energy matters.
1. High level radioactive wastes are highly radioactive "wastes resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes
from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated
reactive fuels." 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978).
2. If predicted capacities are actually met, permanent storage facilities for 75,000 containers, each containing 6.3 cubic feet of high level wastes will be required by the year 2010.
3. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub norm. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Nuclear plant because of the failure to consider the problem of
waste disposal. Effective with that decision, nuclear waste disposal
must now form an integral part of the planning considerations in the
construction of new nuclear power plants.
WASTE PRCDUCTS

The features of the waste problem may be seen by reference to the
regulations contained in Appendix F, 10 CFR § 50 (1978) which
provide that
1. Facilities for the temporary storage of high-level radioactive wastes may be located on privately owned property.
2. A fuel reprocessing plant's inventory of high-level radioactive liquid waste will be limited to that produced in the prior
five years.
3. High-level liquid wastes shall be converted to a dry solid
as required to comply with this inventory limitation and placed
in a sealed container prior to transfer to a Federal repository
in a shipping cask meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
4. The dry solid shall be chemically, thermally, and radiolytically stable to the extent that the equilibrium pressure in the
sealed container will not exceed the safe operating pressure for
that container during the period from canning through a minimum of 90 days after receipt at the Federal repository.
5. All of these high-level radioactive wastes shall be transferred to a Federal repository no later than 10 years following
separation of fission products from the irradiated fuel.
6. Upon receipt, the Federal repository will assume permanent custody of these radioactive waste materials although industry will pay the Federal Government a charge which together with interest on unexpended balances will be designed
to defray all costs of disposal and perpetual surveillance.
7. USAEC will take title to the radioactive waste material
upon transfer to a Federal repository.
8. Disposal of high-level radioactive fission product waste
material will not be permitted on any land other than that
owned and controlled by the Federal Government.
The criteria which specify land ownership and control are trivial
and require no comment. The balance of the criteria are based upon
certain characteristic hazards and operational constraints, both as

1978-79

Nuclear Power Wastes

used in the past and as proposed for the future.
In the past it has been the low level wastes which have received
serious attention. This is due only to the much simpler problems
posed by these low level wastes. Low level wastes may be described
as secondary or indirect wastes. These consist of tools, wiping rags,
and vessels which have either intentionally or unintentionally acquired the property of being radioactive by coming into contact with
radioactive materials. These generally have a rather low specific
activity and are normally buried in trenches in land which has been
set aside for that purpose. It is the high level wastes which pose the
real problem.
The high level wastes include the radioactive material which is
directly formed by the fission process taking place in the nuclear
reactor itself. In the past these have generally been dissolved and
stored in the liquid state in large tanks designed to hold the contents
for periods of about twenty years. We have only recently reached the
point where serious thought is being given to the storage of this everincreasing quantity of waste material for indefinite times into the
future. The most recent thinking calls for converting the liquid
radwaste into a solid form by various sintering processes in which
the radioactive material is brought to a high temperature and
formed into a ceramic material which is insoluable and hence resistant to leaching by water. This sintered material will then be placed
in cylinders having a capacity of 6.3 cubic feet of material.
The material would be sintered and packaged after ten years
storage at a fuel processing site, the purpose of the storage being to
allow some of the radioactivity to decay, especially that associated
with the shorter half-lived species. These cannisters would 4then be
delivered to Federal fuel repositories for long-term storage.
What do we do with this high level waste? Shall we store it above
ground in what has been called a Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF), or shall we store it below ground in geological forma4. The nature of these repositories has not yet been established. It is estimated that by
the year 2010 the U.S. nuclear capacity will be such that 7300 cannisters per year will be
shipped to the federal repositories containing some 6400 megacuries of radioactive material.
The heat output of these cannisters will be approximately 22,000 kilowatts. The cumulative
number of cannisters by the year 2010 will be 75,000. This material must be stored safely for
periods of time ranging up to hundreds or even thousands of years under such conditions that
the material cannot reach the biosphere. See Draft, Environmental Statement, Management
Radioactive Waste 2, 3-9 (Sepof Commercial High Level and Transuranium-Contaminated
tember 1974) (USAEC, WASH 1539).
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tions such as salt domes? Suppose we put it in a salt dome. Can we
guarantee that because no water has infiltrated the dome for the
past millions of years water will not infiltrate the formation during
the next thousand? The formation may have been seismically stable
for the past millions of years, but that does not guarantee stability
for the next thousand years. What about the heat generated? The
heat generated by the radioactive decay process is sufficient to raise
the temperature of the cannisters to several hundred degrees Fahrenheit after a few years. What effect would this have on the physical integrity of the storage facility? What are the effects of radiation
upon the materials over long periods of time? Should the disposal
sites be located near the plants or at great distances from the
plants? If the latter, what are the hazards associated with transporting the wastes? Also, what is the stability of our social and political
institutions over a time scale measured in centuries? Engineering
projects are not designed to last forever, unless one is building an
Egyptian pyramid. The pyramids eventually fell into neglect and
disrepair. Would the same thing happen to a waste storage facility?
How does one establish an experimental data base for the migration
of radioactive materials occurring over thousands of years?5
There are a number of other questions, which, while they may be
less obvious, are no less important. For example: the high level
wastes consist of two components. The first component consists of
the fission products themselves. These are radioactive atoms of
medium atomic weight formed by the fission of uranium 235 or
plutonium 239. These generally have relatively short half lives of
thirty years or less. This means that in 700 years the radioactivity
due to this component will decrease by a factor of ten million, and
by then the material can be considered as radioactively inert. The
required waste storage time for these components is thus measured
on a scale of hundreds of years. The other component consists of the
actinides (such as actinium, thorium, uranium, neptunium and plutonium) which are formed not by the fission process itself, but
rather by neutron absorption of the original fuel material, be it
5. Recently some evidence has come to light which suggests that the peculiar conditions
required for a self-sustaining nuclear reaction can, in rare circumstances, be met in nature.
This apparently happened at the Okla mine in Gabon, Africa. It is believed that a uranium
deposit underwent spontaneous fission about 1.8 billion years ago. The reaction is estimated
to have lasted for about 600,000 years. This event may provide the only experimental evidence
regarding the migrrtion of fission products over a geological time scale. This event is described in G.A. Cowan, A Natural Fission Reactor, 235 SCIENTIFIC AMEmcAN 36 (July 1976).
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uranium or plutonium, or thorium in the case of the thorium
breeder reactor. These are highly toxic from a chemical toxicity
point of view, and generally have half lives measured in thousands
of years. While the actinides initially contribute a much smaller
portion of the total radioactivity, they eventually become the dominant contributors after a few hundred years as a result of their much
longer half lives. This disparity suggests that it might be advantageous to separate these two components by chemical procedures,
and adopt different storage strategies for each.
SOME LIrIGATIONAL ASPECTS

It is of interest to note that concern for the environmental hazards
of radioactive materials antedated the present environmental movement by several decades. This was due, no doubt, to the greater and
more easily perceived hazards associated with radioactive material
than with less intimidating substances such as sulfur dioxide (SO1 ).
The development of the entire field of nuclear reactors and radioactive material production was a slow process which started at the
turn of the century. The dangers were perceived before the magnitude of the problem became too large. In addition, most of this
development during the first fifty years took place in a scientific
atmosphere which was more concerned with the effects on the outside world than would be true of the atmosphere present in the
profit oriented industrial sector of our society. It is noteworthy that
despite the complete absence of governmental regulations, the
World War I Manhattan project, which developed the nuclear reactor, displayed a degree of safety and concern for the environment
which is extraordinary when viewed in hindsight. The regulations
were internally imposed by the very people engaged in the work
itself.
Following the war it rapidly became evident that the prolifieration of nuclear reactors as an important source of electrical power
generation would require serious regulation on the national level,
and, hopefully, on the international level as well. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,' provides for the licensing of commercial reactors in a two stage proceeding. The first stage determines
whether the facility should be constructed in the first place, while
6.

42 U.S.C. § 2242 (Supp. V 1975).
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the second stage is designed to determine whether the facility, once
constructed, should be licensed to operate.7 These proceedings are
directed mainly toward the safety of the nuclear reactor viewed as
an isolated system. The responsibility for all aspects of the nuclear
industry, including licensing, overseeing, and research and development was placed in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC). The AEC was abolished by the Energy Reorganization Act
of 19748 and its functions were divided between two new administrative organizations. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)l was given the responsibility for overseeing all the
technological aspects of the development of nuclear power (as well
as all other energy sources); thus ERDA (now DOE) might be considered as the hardware agency. The regulatory functions and aspects of the AEC were handed over to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which now handles all licensing proceedings previously handled by the AEC. The regulatory aspects of the Atomic
Energy Act have been greatly broadened and complicated by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)0 which, insofar
as it is applied to nuclear reactor matters, may be considered as a
substantial amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.
NEPA, as it has developed since its inception, has become the
single most powerful weapon in the hands of the intervening organizations. At the present time, almost all of the technical issues regarding nuclear wastes as discussed in the previous section have
received judicial attention, either directly or indirectly. Nuclear
power is particularly susceptible to attack under NEPA, since the
installation of any nuclear facility requires the active concurrence
of the NRC through its licensing proceedings; this is a major federal
action, and brings to bear the full force of NEPA.
The first major blow was struck in 1971, a scant two years after
passage of NEPA, while the courts, as well as the litigants on both
sides, were still struggling with the meaning and effect of NEPA. In
promulgating its NEPA rules," the AEC proposed a number of
7. See generally Power Reactor Development Corp. v. IUEW, 367 U.S. 396 (1961). These
proceedings are conducted before a three member Atomic Safety Licensing Board, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2241, which is the counterpart of an Administrative Law Judge in other agencies. The board
is typically composed of two nuclear physicists and one lawyer who acts as chairman.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (Supp. V 1975).
9. The Energy Research and Development Administration is now known as the Department of Energy.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). NEPA became effective January 1, 1970.
11. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. D (1971). Appendix D is currently being revised.
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points which were considered weak by environmentalists. These included (1) that hearing boards conducting independent reviews of
staff recommendations need not take into account environmental
factors unless affirmatively raised; (2) a prohibition against raising
non-radiological issues; (3) a prohibition against considering issues
which were deemed satisfactory by other federal agencies; and (4)
a deferral of consideration of the environmental issues to the operating licensing stage of the proceedings under certain conditions.
These points were successfully challenged in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. AEC. 2 In dealing with the fourth point
3
1
the court noted:

Once a facility has been completely constructed, the economic
cost of any alteration may be very great. In the language of
NEPA, there is likely to be an "irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources," which will inevitably restrict the
Commission's options.
By refusing to consider requirement of alterations until construction is completed, the Commission may effectively foreclose the environmental protection desired by Congress. It may
also foreclose rigorous consideration of environmental factors
at the eventual operating license proceedings. If "irreversible
and irretrievable commitment[s] of resources" have already
been made, the license hearing (and any public intervention
therein) may become a hollow exercise.
The potential power of the words "irretrievable commitments" was
in all probability not recognized by the framers of NEPA. Taken at
their face value, the words seemingly refer to separate and independent projects. This was the manner in which the Calvert Cliffs'
court used the words "irretrievable commitment" in applying them
to a particular facility. The meaning was soon to be greatly broadened.
Having decided that extensive environmental considerations were
required for the construction and licensing of nuclear facilities, it
remained to be seen how far these considerations were to be extended. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v.
AEC (SIPI),"' the issue of new expanding technology was directly
12.
13.
14.

449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1128.
481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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confronted. Here the expanding technology was the new liquid metals fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), a technology in which ERDA
(then AEC) was prepared to invest billions of dollars in an effort to
get the new technology off the ground and prepare for the demand
for nuclear facilities which was forecast for the latter part of this
century. The program was stopped dead in its tracks by environmental considerations. The decision was also pregnant with implications for the entire nuclear waste problem. The court noted that
"[sitatements must be written late enough in the development
process to contain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough so that whatever information is contained can
practically serve as an input into the decision-making process. '"' 5
The same statement would presumably apply to the high level
nuclear waste storage program since the long-term schedule for
developing that program is similar to the long lead time for the development of the LMFBR. In considering the waste issue directly
it was noted that "[tihese wastes will pose an admitted hazard to
human health for hundreds of years, and will have to be maintained
in special repositories. The environmental problems attendant upon
processing, transporting and storing these wastes, and the other
environmental issues raised by widespread deployment of LMFBR
power plants, warrant the most searching scrutiny under NEPA."''
The same statement, of course, can be applied to the deployment
of any type of nuclear reactor.
The following year saw some backing off from this position by the
Second Circuit. In Ecology Action v. AEC, " the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to dismiss a licensing
order for reason of the exclusion of certain broad environmental
issues, among them the lack of consideration of the incremental
effects of mining and processing the fuel requirements of the plant,
and also the incremental burden placed upon long term storage
facilities." This court adopted, as it were, a "point source" criterion
for the consideration of environmental factors, leaving the consideration of broader factors to other proceedings and other environmental statements."
15.
16.
17.
18.
infra.
19.

Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1098.
492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974).
The court also considered the energy conservation issue. Id. at 999. But see note 25
[Ilt would be absurd that the issue of the environmental effect of uranium
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It is questionable whether this approach is currently good law. In
a recent decision the D.C. Circuit remanded NRC's licensing of the
Vermont Yankee nuclear plant precisely because of a failure to consider the joint problems of fuels reprocessing and nuclear waste.Y
Again the "irretrievable commitment" issue rose to the fore. "Once
a series of reactors is operating, it is too late to consider whether
.21 It
the wastes they generate should have been produced ..
would appear that nuclear waste processing and disposal must now
form an integral part of the planning considerations in the construction of new nuclear power plants. The court specifically rejected the
argument that a more appropriate occasion for the determination of
these environmental effects would be at the time of construction of
the processing and waste disposal facilities themselves. We appear
to be reaching the point where in each instance the complete circle
of environmental factors must be considered, and the greater the
perceived hazard, the more complete the circle must be. At the
moment the circle appears to be undergoing a rapid expansion in
its circumference.
Population density in the vicinity of the site must be given consideration. 22 The possibility of plutonium theft was specifically addressed in NRDC v. NRC23 where it was observed that the draft
environmental impact statement "was inadequate, particularly
since it failed to address adequately the special dangers of sabotage
and theft posed by large scale transportation of plutonium materials. '24 In addition the court also found the environmental impact
statement lacking in a consideration of energy alternatives to nuclear power. This question was addressed specifically in Aeschliman
mining in Wyoming should have to be separately considered on every application to
construct nuclear plants from Maine to California. Rather the idea that a licensing
agency should endeavor to identify environmental issues common to many applications and handle them in "generic" proceedings would seem to benefit all the parties,
particularly the poorly-financed environmental groups.
492 F.2d at 1002.
20. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power v. NRDC 435 U.S. 591 (1978).
21. 547 F.2d at 640.
22. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America v. AEC, 515 F.2d 513
(7th Cir. 1975). Here the population center contained less than the 25,000 maximum at the
time just prior to the opening of the proceedings. The construction approval by the AEC was
set aside because by the time the plant would have become operational, the population would
exceed 25,000. Id. at 520-21.
23. 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 833.
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v. NRC2 where construction permits for two nuclear power plants
were remanded to NRC for failure to consider the possibility of
alternative sources of energy, and in particular whether the need for
these plants could be vitiated by proper "energy conservation".
Cost-benefit approaches with regard to human health are difficult
to quantify, particularly when taken in conjunction with the criterion "as low as practicable". 6 An interim value of $1,000 per total
body man-remin was
established in York Committee for a Safe Envi8
ronment v. NRC.

A basic problem underlying much of the discussion lies in our lack
of knowledge in many areas. The quantity of nuclear waste which
is produced by any given plant can be predicted to a high degree of
accuracy. Such is not the case for the ultimate damage which may
be caused by these wastes. This problem was noted in SIPI with the
words "one of the functions of a NEPA statement is to indicate the
extent to which environmental effects are essentially unknown."
25. 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This case was reversed and remanded in Consumers
Power Company v. Aeschliman, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The Supreme Court considered this case
along with the Vermont Yankee case, notes 3 and 20 supra, and remanded the decision on a
procedural basis. The Court did not hold that energy conservation measures need not be
considered, but only that they did not have to be considered by NRC in the stage of the
proceedings under litigation, and that a determination by another regulatory agency might
,suffice. Id. at 524. The final result may be the addition of a new section to environmental
impact statements which discusses whether the need for a new facility can be mitigated by
proper conservation measures.
Note that the two cases were handled in one decision by the Supreme Court.
26. In connection with the requirements relating to radioactive iodine emissions, 10
C.F.R. §§ 20.1,50.34a, 50.36a (1975), the following definition is put forth:
The term "as low as practicable" as used in this part means as low as is practicably
achievable taking into account the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety . . . and in relation to
the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest.
10 C.F.R. § 50.34a (1975). This terminology was changed to "reasonably achievable" in 10
C.F.R. § 50.34a (1978). The related terms "best practicable technology" (BPT), "best available technology" (BAT) and "best available technology economically achievable" (BATEA)
are also in vogue with regulatory agencies, not only in the nuclear area, but also in ordinary
land, air and water areas. The terms mean different things to different people, depending
upon whether one is on the enforcement or non-compliance side, and much recent debate has
been engendered by these terms.
27. The rem is an acronym for "roentgen-equivalent-man" and is the amount of radiation
which has the same biological effect as one roentgen (the classical radiation unit) of X-ray
radiation. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.4(c) (1975). The annual natural background radiation exposure
in the U.S. varies from about 0.1 to 0.25 rem.
28. 527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court did not say how it arrived at the dollar figure,
but noted that it would be used "[als an interim measure and until establishment and
adoption of better values (or other appropriate criteria)." Id. at 815.
29. 481 F.2d at 1092.
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One basic problem is the fact that the public often misinterprets the
scientific criteria of "truth." Just as "beyond the shadow of a
doubt" in criminal prosecutions does not imply absolute certainty,
so too are scientific statements regarded as "true" despite the fact
that they may not be true in the sense of absolute certainty. Inherent in the statement that a particular sample weighs 1.3275 grams
is the notion that in all probability the sample weighs something
other than 1.3275 grams. On the other hand, it is more probable that
the sample weighs 1.3275 grams than any other individual value
with that same number of significant figures. In more complex matters the uncertainty in conclusions may be much greater. This was
recognized to some extent in North Anna Environmental Coalition
v. NRC30 where the plaintiff sought review of a license allowing the
construction of a power plant on a geological fault which had been
inactive for 500,000 years. The court refused the sought-for relief,
and observed that the Atomic Energy Act did not require risk-free
siting of power plants. This problem was addressed by Chief Judge
Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia:
This case raises for me several lurking problems of untested
technology and protection of the public against risk. Here that
concern is presented in a highly rarefied form: there is essentially no dispute over the amount of radiation to be released to
the environment by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
Nor is there pitched battle over the low risk factor presently
assigned to the release of such amounts. Science believes that
it can quantify and understand the danger posed to organisms
and the environment by those undisputed levels. The risk at
issue herein is the risk that such present scientific knowledge
is simply wrong or blind in such degree that after the passage
of time and further study, the danger to society will be seen as
greater than expected by orders of magnitude. Said differently,
the twin risks are that either science is ignorant of entire categories of harm, or that rule-permitted quantities of radiation
do the type of damage they are thought to, but to a far greater
extent, or in a cumulative, fashion with other factors so as to
render difference in degree a difference in kind. These risks are
hardest to calculate because they surpass the problems posed
30.

533 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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by mere ignorance of a new technology. The scientists and
decision-makers are asked to assess and make allowance for the
probabilities that present scientific understanding is itself ter3
ribly wrong. 1
The problem is far from resolution.
THE VALUE JUDGMENT DICHOTOMY

In the ordinary contract or tort case the issues raised are closely
related to the goals, aims, and aspirations of the adversaries with
particular reference to the specific cause of action at hand. The
contract breachee wants the contract declared valid and further
wishes a particular quantum of damages; the breacher desires the
opposite. In a tort action the injured party wishes to show negligence
and damage and wishes a monetary reward; the tortfeasor desires
the opposite. The aims of the two parties go no further than the
particular case in point. In the usual environmental intervenor proceeding, on the other hand, it is often not the specific cause of action
which is the real controversy, but rather the entire policy which is
in issue. The real issue is an underlying moral value judgment. The
specific case in hand serves as a means of furthering the attainment
of these moral values.
The present national concern with the twin problems of energy
production and pollution production has generated an intense debate over the last several years. The debate will in all probability
continue with undiminished fervor for at least another decade, and
will take place in the press, in the courts, in the polling booths, and
in other public forums. The parties to the controversy often have
diametrically opposed views.
At the one extreme we have a group which we might term proexpansionist. According to this group the economic well-being of the
nation presently faces a crisis, and unless we rapidly expand our
electrical generation capacity the result might well be economic
chaos. Part of this expanded capacity can come from coal fired
stations, at least in the short term future, but our long term problems can only be met by a heavy reliance on nuclear power generation. The environmental problems associated with radioactive
31. Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
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wastes from nuclear stations and with S02 emissions from coal fired
plants have been grossly overestimated. The regulations which have
been established-are in excess of what is needed, and can only be
met at a prohibitive cost, if indeed present technology suffices to
meet these limits.
At the other extreme is the intervening group whom we might
term the anti-expansionists. This group feels that the immense
problems associated with the radioactive wastes from nuclear power
plants, and the dangers from the plants themselves, must first be
greatly reduced before any expansion of this industry is possible.
Particularly severe are the problems associated with nuclear waste
and with the plutonium produced by breeder reactors since there is
no fail-safe method to ensure that a radical guerrilla group cannot
acquire sufficient plutonium to manufacture an atomic bomb. The
environmental problems associated with power generation have not
been overestimated; if anything they have been underestimated,
and the costs of meeting the environmental and safety regulations
are not incommensurate with the gains to be achieved.
These are the extreme views, and most of the responsible opinion
lies somewhere between the two extremes. What many'people in
both camps fail to realize is that there are several subjective factors
in their respective views which are associated with certain desired
goals in life, and these are value judgments. As an example, suppose
we assume that the following two statements are irrefutably true.
1. If we continue to expand our electrical power generation
base as proposed by the pro-expansionist group, then the increased pollution levels arising from these extra plants, radioactive wastes from the nuclear plants and S02 emissions from
the conventional plants, will cause reduction in the average life
expectancy by five years.
2. If we maintain our present generation base as proposed by
the anti-expansionists then future electrical shortages will
cause a severe curtailment of our industrial base and result in
unemployment figures as high as 20 percent (not to mention
widespread brownouts and lack of air conditioning in the consumer sector).
Note very carefully that we do not in any way mean to imply that
either of these statements is in fact true. We merely assume that
they are for the sake of this exercise. It should be clear from the
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above two stated possibilities that an ultimate decision cannot always be based upon technological arguments alone. In fact, technological arguments may be irrelevant. These two grossly simplified
statements present a choice between shortened life and economic
well-being. In the real world the choice is more complex.
Even the above two statements have been stated in a grossly
simplified fashion, and both have several consequences which follow. The first statement stopped with a shortened life expectancy.
It can be safely assumed that if the life expectancy is shortened by
five years, there will be severe consequences to the health of people
before they die. People will be sicker, and our national health bill
will soar to even higher levels. The second statement stopped with
the much higher unemployment rate. Those who suffer unemployment will also suffer from the dietary deficiency which results from
lack of money, and their life expectancy will be shortened. The cost
of governmental relief would soar to even higher levels. Finally, it
is questionable whether our present system of government could
continue in the face of such high continuous unemployment levels.
There is, however, some common ground in the two diverse
camps. Both sides agree that in the best of all possible worlds solar
energy is the best solution, it being non-polluting, but even in this
agreement there is still a dichotomy of views. Solar energy is far
from being technologically feasible. Some even argue that it will
never become commercially viable on a large scale. The proexpansionists argue that we cannot wait for solar energy developments, and we must expand with presently available technology.
The anti-expansionists, on the other hand, argue that we should
invest heavily in the development of solar energy rather than expanding facilities with the present polluting systems.
What is particularly unfortunate is the severe lack of technical
information and the capacity to understand the available information.32 This lack of understanding is all too common in both camps
32. Some environmental groups have criticized environmental reports on the basis of their
lack of readability by laymen. See, e.g., the Letter from Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. to Dr. James Livermore of the A.E.C. which appears in Draft, Environmental Report,
note 4 supra, at C-2. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1342 (S.D. Tex. 1973), it
was noted that environmental impact statements must be "written in language that is understandable, to non-technical minds and yet contain enough scientific reasoning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of their expertise". It would be rather difficult to
write a technical document which was comprehensible in its entirety to laymen. Perhaps
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in the raging controversy. While the problems are not exclusively
technological, it is not possible for any individual to make an intelligent decision on the matter without some understanding of the technical issues. At the same time, consideration of the technical issues
alone is not suficient.
The problem is finding a solution within the context of our present industrial society which is based upon an expanding economy.
The momentum for that system was set in motion at the start of
the industrial revolution, and the inertia which presently exists is
so great that the trend cannot be reversed without a great effort.
According to Newton's Laws of Motion, the direction of a moving
body can only be altered by the application of a force, and this force
must be proportional to the momentum. The same holds true for
economic systems. The Club of Rome may be correct in their analysis and predictions, but they have given us no viable alternatives or
plans of action.s
The problems of an energy short industrial society have been
brought to the fore in the years since the oil boycott, and have been
accentuated in the gas short winter of 1977 and the coal strike of
1977-78. It seems highly likely that solar energy can become a reality, but not before the next century. The basic question is whether
we can get through the next twenty five years in one piece so that
the alternatives may come to fruition. The only present alternatives
are coal and nuclear, and both have their problems..
The present intervention system has severe deficiencies and appears to be weighted in favor of the intervenors. The cost of the legal
regulatory process has been vastly increased both in direct money
outlays and in time spent. A realistic assessment of the intervention
process has never been carried out. It is not yet known whether any
real substantive changes have been introduced into project designs
as a result of this intervention process. It may well be that the only
result is the rewriting of environmental impact statements with the
inclusion of additional alternatives, all of them non-viable. The
present actions are all being taken piecemeal. From a logical point
of view it seems absurd to carefully consider the waste problem
environmental impact statements should be issued in two versions, a technical one for technical people, and an "unofficial" simplified one for laymen. ,
33. D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. W. Hehrens I, The Limits to
Growth, A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (2d ed.
1972) (New York, Universe Books).
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separately for each plant under consideration when the problems
are identical for each plant." It would seem appropriate to examine
the underlying issue in its entire context thoroughly examining the
basic issue itself rather than relegating this consideration on a piecemeal basis to a large number of individual environmental impact
statements. It would seem appropriate to make one grand decision
on the suitability of nuclear power itself, and then to proceed from
there with a consideration of the site specific problems associated
with individual plants. The intervenors, in many instances, are
arguing a moral cause which may or may not be correct.3 They feel
they are the saviours of society, and they may well be. Unfortunately the constraints imposed upon our present society are such that
society as we know it might first have to be destroyed before it can
be saved in this manner.
34. See note 19 supra.
35. For example: "There is just one question: what gives anyone the right to build or
operate nuclear plants anywhere? . . . The wisdom of creating a massive radioactive legacy
should and must be taken seriously-with the intention of preparing a realistic environmental
statement and acting accordingly, even if such action is not in line with the morally bankrupt
atomic establishment". Letter from Citizens Association for Safe Energy to the USAEC (Dec.
8, 1973) appearing in Draft, Environmental Statement, note 4 supra, at C-46.

